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Youth Mobility Schemes: The Panacea for Ending Free Movement? 
Abstract 
Free movement has been at the heart of the Brexit debate, with the government grappling between 
satisfying public and business demands for restrictive and liberal approaches to immigration 
respectively. In response the government have advocated temporary migration as a potential solution, 
including an expanded UK-EU Youth Mobility Scheme (YMS) modelled on the current Tier 5 YMS 
on the assumption that YMS migrants undertake low skilled jobs. Little is known about this visa or 
the labour market activity of YMS migrants. Drawing on policy analysis alongside survey and 
interview data from Australian YMS migrants, this paper seeks to bridge some of these knowledge 
gaps, arguing that an expanded EU YMS will not attract significant EU migrants, and is far from a 
remedy for free movement ending.  
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The UK labour market has come to be structurally reliant on EU labour to fill shortages in low and 
mid skilled sectors for over a decade. With 500,000 EU migrants employed in low skilled/low wage 
industries in 2017i, the prospect of ending free movement raises major questions as to how these 
shortages will be filled. Expanding temporary migration programmes, such as the UK’s Tier 5 Youth 
Mobility Scheme (YMS), whilst no panacea appears to be an attractive solution for policymakers to 
this dilemma. Whilst details on the UK’s future immigration system remain ambiguous, the 
government has proposed an expanded EU-UK wide Youth Mobility Scheme, modelled on the UK’s 
current Tier 5 Youth Mobility Schemeii, which allows young migrants from selected countries to live 
and work in the UK for up to two years. The government has proposed such a scheme because ‘it is 
believed most people who come to the UK under a YMS engage in lower skilled work’ and therefore 
the new scheme will ‘provide an additional source of labour for the UK labour market’iii.  
The UK’s Youth Mobility Scheme (previously working holidaymakers scheme) has long been a 
passage for young migrants to combine tourism whilst working in the UK. This is a middling form of 
migration that sits on the nexus between tourism and work migration, which has long represented a 
rite of passage for young people. Tier 5 migrants including YMS migrants remain politically hidden 
by their association with tourism, and with no employer sponsor requirements for the YMS the labour 
market activity of this group is largely unknown. With an expanded EU wide YMS being the only 
current concrete policy proposal, an examination of whether the assumptions surrounding this 
mobility are accurate is warranted. This paper examines the YMS, including the policy evolution and 
labour market activity of current YMS migrants to explore whether a EU wide YMS is feasible or 
even desirable. Drawing on a study of Australian YMS migrants in London, I argue that the YMS is 
unlikely to attract significant EU migrants to the UK to meet employers’ needs. If this scheme is to be 
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successful in attracting significant numbers of young EU migrants, various rights under the YMS 
would need to be expanded.  
Methodologically the article is based on three sources. Firstly, policy analysis of relevant government 
documents combined with findings from an immigration policy index (ImPol) to visualise changes in 
the YMS over time. Secondly, 75 surveys with Tier 5 Youth Mobility Australian migrants living in 
London. Thirdly, 20 in depth interviews YMS Australians conducted between April 2015 and May 
2016.   
Liberal labour market  
The plans to end free movement, and with it a loss of EU labour, has panicked many UK employers 
and not without reason. The Confederation of British Industry estimates that EU workers make up to 
30 per cent of the total workforce in different sectors, that the contribution of EU workers ‘will be 
needed in the future’ and that the ‘current non-EU immigration system is not a solution for EU 
nationals’iv.  
The UK’s reliance on EU labour stems from its mode of capitalism, typically regarded as a liberal 
market economy v  entailing low employment protection, light regulations and a large low-wage 
sector vi . There is consequently a lack of coordinated wage bargaining arrangements, and firms 
primarily coordinate their activities via competition market arrangements. As a result, there are 
incentives for employers to delay costly technological advancements in favour of depending on low-
wage labourvii. Declining apprenticeship and training schemes in Britain have further fostered the 
reliance on importing labour. Coupled with decades of deregulation this has lowered incentives for 
employers to invest in skills and training for the domestic labour force. As a result, many sectors such 
as social care, retail and hospitality and construction have come to rely on EU labour to fill labour 
shortages in key sectors in lieu of a native workforce willing to take up low quality jobs.   
Immigration policy: Temporary migration 
Key to the UK labour market being reliant on EU labour is that free movement requires no 
certification and in turn no bureaucracy. This has meant that the UK has enjoyed a pool of flexible EU 
workers willing to take jobs which the native workforce deem undesirable, and in turn government 
has had the luxury of foregoing establishing any politically contentious low skilled visas. This is in 
contrast to the principal work entry channel - Tier 2 – for skilled workers where workers must meet 
stringent eligibility criterion including salary thresholds of £30,000 and employers must undertake 
lengthy, bureaucratic and expensive sponsorship requirements. For employers seeking highly skilled 
workers with long-term contracts, such an endeavour is worth the pain. However, low or mid skilled 
sectors where vacancies cannot fulfil the proposed stringent Tier 2 requirements and job forecasting is 
more short term have different needs, above all flexible workers willing to undertake low quality, time 
limited jobs.  
Yet whilst the labour market demands a stock of flexible migrant labour, the public has expressed a 
preference for migration to be reduced. Temporary migration is seen as the in-between solution 
satisfying both the ‘no borders’ and ‘no migrants’ argumentsviii. The popularity of TMPs amongst 
policymakers stems from the so-called ‘triple-win’ outcomes: the host country can meet labour market 
demands whilst appeasing electoral concerns over permanent settlement; the sending country benefits 
from both remittances and skills transfer/brain gain from migrants acquiring skills in the destination 
state and transferring these skills on return; and the migrants themselves benefit by a mechanism 
which provides people from low-income countries with better access to labour markets in high-
income states.. As a result, the UK government has been endorsing temporary migration since the 
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introduction of the net migration target in 2010, although there is no explicit or official commitment 
to temporary migration.  
Whilst policymakers advocate for temporary migration, TMPs have rightly been critiqued for being 
potentially exploitative.. Australia’s equivalent YMS – working holidaymakers scheme – sets a 
precedent for the dangers of exploitation of young temporary migrants, including ‘gross 
underpayment of wages, excessive hours of work, sexual and other forms of harassment and sub-
standard living conditions’ix. Such exploitation has been aggravated by new policy terms that nudge 
WHMs into specific regional low skilled sectors in return for an entitlement to work for a second year 
in Australiax. More generally, policies that discourage long-term settlement provide few incentives to 
integrate, leading to poor community cohesion.  
Despite the dangers of rights violations under badly regulated TMPs, the Coalition government (2010-
2015) and the Conservative administrations (2015-2019) have favoured a migration system 
underpinned by temporariness. This is in pursuant with the net migration target put forward by the 
Conservative Party to reduce immigration to ‘sustainable levels’. Crucially third country nationals 
who are present for less than 12 months do not count in the net migration figures. A major component 
of the Conservative governments’ policy has been to ensure that economic immigration is an 
exclusively temporary phenomenon, or to ‘break the link’ between permanent and temporary 
migration as epitomised by Prime Minister May when Home Secretary in 2010: 
It is too easy, at the moment, to move from temporary residence to permanent 
settlement…Working in Britain for a short period should not give someone the right to settle 
in Britain…Settling in Britain should be a cherished right, not an automatic add on to a 
temporary way in’xi .  
This appears to be a ‘point of principle for the Conservatives’xii, with former Prime Minister Cameron 
stating in April 2011 ‘It cannot be right that people coming to fill short-term skills gaps can stay long 
term’xiii.  
Whilst at the time of writing the future immigration system post Brexit is unclear, the government 
published two White Papers in 2018 that signalled the direction of future policy. In recognition of the 
short-term recruitment challenges employers are facing when free movement ends, the government 
have proposed a temporary strictly time limited 12-month visa for all skill levels from ‘low risk 
countries’ with no route to permanency or right to bring family. This is proposed as a transitory 
measure that will be regularly reviewed, subject to numerical caps, tightening criteria and possibly 
closure if economic conditions warrant it xiv. The government may also re-establish the Seasonal 
Agricultural Workers Scheme to fill labour market demands in agriculture and horticulture, and the 
government are currently running a small-scale pilot scheme to this effect.  
Yet the key consistent proposal in both White Papers is the establishment of an EU wide Youth 
Mobility Scheme. The government have proposed an EU-EU YMS as part of their Mobility 
Framework ‘to ensure that young people can continue to enjoy the social, cultural and educational 
benefits of living in the EU and the UK’xv . The government intend to design the scheme in broadly 
the same way as the existing YMS ‘taking account of EU specificities’ with the government claiming 
that ‘it will provide an additional source of labour for the UK labour market’xvi. This warrants an 
examination of the current YMS and how this visa has evolved from tourist mobility to labour 
migration.  
Policy Evolution: Working holidaymakers and Youth Mobility  
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The existing UK Youth Mobility Scheme (YMS), formerly known as the working holidaymakers 
scheme, (WHM) is historically one of the longest running youth schemes globally. Concordant with 
post-war concerns to preserve ties with the Commonwealth – ironically due to Britain’s new dominant 
geopolitical alliance with the European Economic Communityxvii − the Commonwealth project was at 
the heart of the original Working Holiday Makers scheme. It was designed principally as a cultural 
exchange programme for young Commonwealth citizens and thus purely intended for tourism and 
cultural exchange. However, the scheme has been transformed over the years from the perspective of 
policymakers from Commonwealth tourist mobility and cultural exchange to a labour market route.  
Throughout the history of the scheme applicants must always retain entry clearance before being 
admitted including obtaining a biometric residence permit. Moreover, both the previous WHM and 
the current YMS work on a reciprocal quota basis with each participating country being allocated a 
number of visas based on reciprocal agreements. There were 41,652 YMS visa granted in the year to 
September 2017, down one per cent on the previous yearxviii.   
Whilst the broad design of the scheme has remained consistent − allowing participants to stay in the 
UK for up to two years, with permission to work and little post entry controls − the eligibility criterion 
and rights attached to this visa have changed over the years, as can be seen from the graph below. The 
graph is derived from the Immigration Policy Index (ImPol), which measures policy restrictiveness 
across time and different visas on a basic ordinal scale. The coding is derived from original legal 
sources in this case the immigration rulesxix.   
GRAPH ONE ABOUT HERE: ELIGIBILITY VERSUS RIGHTS YSM  
For the duration of the 1990s, the eligibility criterion and rights attached to the visa remained 
consistent. The 2000s New Labour governments significantly liberalised the WHM by allowing 
participants to transit to other visas in country,  increasing the age eligibility from 18-27 to 18-30, 
whilst also liberalising the type of work that could be undertaken. The liberalising changes made to 
the Working Holiday Makers Scheme were principally made to ‘provide a pool of flexible labour that 
can help alleviate recruitment difficulties faced by UK employers’xx. However, in 2005 the scheme 
was restricted, with the old criterion being reinstated.  
Following the introduction of the points-based system (PBS), in 2008 the Working Holidaymakers 
Scheme was consolidated with other temporary routes (such as Au Pair visa) and was renamed the 
Youth Mobility Scheme (YMS), subsided under Tier 5 of the PBS which is specifically for temporary 
migration. The age criterion was raised again from 28 to 30 and a maintenance requirement was 
attached to this visa for the first time. Yet the most significant change has been the addition of non-
Commonwealth nationals as participants, moving the scheme away from Commonwealth facilitated 
mobility. 
The YMS is currently restricted to eight participating countries, which have a special reciprocal 
agreement with the UK.. These include: Australia, Canada, Japan, Monaco, New Zealand, Hong 
Kong, Republic of Korea and Taiwan. Each participating country is prescribed an annual allocation of 
total YMS visas, based on reciprocal agreements with Australians allocated 70 per cent of the total 
YMS visas available in 2016. As was previously the case under the WHM scheme, those with British 
overseas, British overseas territories or British national (overseas) citizenships’ can also apply.   
. The YMS is a one-shot visa meaning that applicants must not previously have entered or spent time 
in the UK on a Working Holiday Visa, or a Tier 5 YMS visa. The current YMS visa gives 24 months 
leave to remain and limited working restrictionsxxi. Participants cannot extend their stay, cannot 
access public funds and cannot bring family. 
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There are two fundamental differences in the YMS visa in contrast to all other UK visas. Firstly, the 
YMS is age specific, and secondly the visa has no sponsorship requirements. In the case of youth 
mobility schemes, temporal eligibility − referring to the biological age restrictions for these visas 
(aged 18-30) – confers particular life stages as desirable bio-political characteristics of migrants where 
youth is prized
xxiii
xxii. Young migrants are then constructed ‘as desirable migrants of the neoliberal state, 
representing labour capacity without the ‘social burden’ associated with being elderly or having 
dependent children’  .  
The second crucial difference in the YMS visa in contrast to all other visas in the UK system is that it 
does not require a job offer, employer sponsorship or stringent Tier 2 eligibility requirements. 
Employers can therefore easily hire YMS migrants without bureaucratic processes or the need to 
conduct a resident labour market test to ensure no resident can fill a vacancy. In this sense, the YMS 
visa is the most liberal in the UK immigration system. At the same time, the lack of certification 
criterion means there is a lack of data available regarding the labour market activity of YMS migrants, 
or indeed their distributional spread across the country.  
Youth Mobility Migrants: Australians in London  
Whilst YMS or working holidaymakers globally are far from a homogenous group, there are a 
number of characteristics that form the typical profile of a working holidaymaker: young, middle 
class, and often highly educated.  The YMS is often undertaken as a rite of passagexxiv for the in-
between life stages for example between higher education and professional careers. Between visa 
(including required savings and the NHS surcharge) and travel costs coupled with savings needed to 
safeguard against initial unemployment, undertaking a prolonged overseas experience, especially in 
London, is an expensive endeavour.  
The research consisted of a sample of 75 YMS Australians predominantly living in London. This is a 
non-representative and a small sample but nonetheless our results provide a snapshot of the activity of 
YMS Australians residing in London. It is important to note that the labour market activity in other 
towns/cities or other nationalities on YMS may be vastly different yet with no sponsorship 
requirements there is no data available on where YMS migrants reside in the UK, why they migrate to 
specific locations or what jobs they undertake. For example, in a study of Canadian YMS migrants in 
Scotland, the majority of respondents were working in hospitality, with many living and working in 
the same hostelsxxv. In another study involving WHM New Zealanders in Britain (mostly London) the 
type of work undertaken by participants ‘varied enormously, from traditional travellers’ jobs (such as 
nanny and bar work), middle income professional jobs like nursing or teaching, to high-powered 
professional career jobs (in finance, banking)’xxvi. 
Participants were selected via snowball sampling with the assistance of an expatriate group (Aussies 
in London) set up specifically for young Australians in Londonxxvii. We conducted a closed survey 
with 75 migrants at various events set up by the group, and twenty of these individuals self-selected 
for in-depth interviews conducted at a later time in various locations across London between April 
2016 and May 2017. The survey sample consisted of 32 male respondents and 43 female respondents, 
with the majority originating from New South Wales (40 per cent), followed by Victoria (25 per cent) 
and Western Australia (13 per cent). Interviews were coded manually using a basic coding framework 
to identify key themes from the interviews including motivations to migrate, integration themes, 
socialisation, and labour market relations.  
From the outset it needs to be stressed that Australian migrants residing in the UK are somewhat 
unique in comparison to other nationalities due to the deep history of migration and colonial ties 
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between nations. The UK has long been the preferred destination for Australians looking to 
permanently emigrate, accounting for 20.9 per cent of Australian emigrants in the period 1996 and 
2006xxviii.  
Labour market activity: assumptions and realities  
While temporary migrants have typically being concentrated in low skilled sectors and often 
face prolonged periods of unemploymentxxix, a striking finding among our respondents was 
that the majority had no difficulties in acquiring a job and were working in high and mid 
skilled professional occupations. The latter finding chimes with other research, which has 
found that a significant number of WHM Antipodean migrants in London work in middle-
income occupations in the health, education and media industriesxxx. The institutional and 
structural mechanisms in place via recruitment channels and commercial agencies 
specifically targeted at young Australians (and especially in teaching sectors) also facilitate 
and streamline YMS Australians into particular social circuits and jobs. The findings 
demonstrate that YMS Australians have a positive and inclusive experience in the UK labour 
market in stark contrast to many other temporary migrants. This stems from employers’ 
apparent preferences for temporally flexible, ultra-mobile workers arguably coupled with 
proficient English, the aesthetic labour characteristic of youth, and the acceptable trade-off of 
precariousness young Australians accept in return for the flexible working arrangements to 
suit their travel plans. Importantly, race and language were important factors shaping YMS 
Australians positive experience, and whiteness, as a ‘passport for privilege’xxxi undoubtedly 
shapes these experiences. Different ethnicities, ethno-culture nationalities and visa statuses 
construct differing preferences for jobs, forging a hierarchy of desirability underpinned by 
economic worth and ethno-cultural privileging.  This hierarchy is key to understanding the 
Australian YMS experience. 
 
While the sample were largely highly skilled – defined as possessing tertiary education − over half did 
not try to get their qualifications recognised in the UK (40), and of those who did 28 had no 
difficulties getting qualifications recognised. The majority of our respondents used a recruitment 
company before leaving Australia to secure employment before arrival., The majority of respondents 
were, unsurprisingly given their temporary status, working on time-limited work contracts, with the 
majority on fixed term contracts lasting less than 12 months. YMS Australians were overall content 
with their precarious contracts; only 24 respondents wanted a more permanent or secure job in the 
UK, and 36 respondents stated they were working in either their ideal job or sector.  
 
The young Australians in our sample were both highly skilled with 46 respondents possessing a 
bachelor degree or higher, and the majority were working high skilled professional jobs. In contrast, 
no respondents were working in elementary occupations. Twenty-five respondents were working in 
the teaching professions, principally as substitute teachers. However, this may be due to a sampling 
bias as we used a snowball sampling strategy and/or that the expatriate group may be overrepresented 
by those in teaching professions due to friendship networks utilising the same service. Young 
Australians find it easy to acquire employment, with 63 respondents in employment and 54 
respondents having applied for between zero and five jobs in total. 
 
The majority of respondents had no trouble in gaining employment in the UK (55), zero respondents 
had experienced discrimination, and over half of respondents said that they have never been in the 
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position of looking for work in the UK (39). Of those that had difficulties in gaining employment, the 
two key issues were administrative loop holes with acquiring national insurance numbers, and the 
time-limited YMS visa itself dissuading employers. YMS Australians are undeterred by precarious 
contracts because mobility is principally for leisure and therefore their primary consideration is short-
term financial gain with maximum employment flexibility:  
[My friend] she gets paid peanuts but with 10 months on her visa to go she’d rather stick to 
that as she doesn’t think another employer will pick her up…a lot of employers want to see 
that longer term visas (Female, 25) 
 
While all participants spoke about being motivated to migrate as a rite of passage and/or time to self-
explore before “growing up”, for some – with London’s global reputation  – it also served as a way to 
build their career prospects. Just under a third of the sample cited work experience and improving 
career prospects as their primary motivation to migrate to Britain, and 50 respondents thought their 
work experience would aid their career when returning to Australia. Broadly, those in the younger 
cohort (aged 18-24) migrated purely for “play” in contrast to older YMS (aged 25-31) Australians 
who while seeking a rite of passage also migrate to the UK for work experience and career 
progression back in their homeland. This in turn highlights the blurriness of this mobility between 
self-exploration and individualisation and economic calculus:  
Essentially there is more of a competitive market, bigger companies involved so it’s more 
competitive and they attract a range of international talent as well, so I guess it’s competitive 
not just in terms of the actual market but also in terms of human resources as well, in terms of 
other people wanting jobs. So it’s quite multicultural in that aspect so I think working with 
people from different countries – that’s value to bring back to Australia in addition to more of 
the job specific components and being able to work with, yes, bigger budgets, more difficult 
clients and different scenarios (Male 29) 
 
Motivations to migrate 
Precarious work was an acceptable trade-off for these young migrants for the pull of London in terms 
of global transport to Europe: ‘You just have to work to sustain travel’ (Female 25).  Sixty five 
respondents had travelled to destinations in Europe during their stay in Britain, and 42 respondents 
cited travelling in Europe specifically as their main motivation to migrate. It is precisely the 
integration of long-term leisure travel with employment, which ‘extends both the temporal and 
experiential dimensions of the overseas experience beyond what is commonly understood as 
tourism’xxxii. Yet this mobility is undoubtedly motivated at least in part, if not primarily, for tourism in 
a broad sense.   
 
What was striking amongst respondents, was that the decision to migrate was not about Britain per se, 
but London specifically and crucially the ease of travelling to Europe: In terms of application for 
leaving Perth I was purely invested in London in hearing about those opportunities… I didn't have 
any interest in any other city to be honest (Male 27). This is not unique to young Australians of 
course, nor is there anything unique about London to other global cities. Nonetheless, one of the key 
pulls of London for these young migrants then is its central position in terms of global transport to 
Europe and more generally hubs of communication flows. 
  
The attraction of London is within its internationally connected cultural and social institutions, and its 
cosmopolitan environment. Interviewees spoke about being enlightened by living in London and 
experiencing ‘super diversity’xxxiii, especially from those who grew up in rural towns in Australia: 
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People said London is a multicultural city. And you’re like of course it is, it’s one of the 
biggest cities and it’s in Europe. But in my head I didn’t expect it to be this multicultural. In 
my head I’d painted a picture of a normal day in London, and I wouldn’t have imagined so 
many varieties of culture, especially coming from Australia where we are multicultural but 
we’re still pretty damn white. So for example we’d never seen an Orthodox Jew before! It’s 
really broadened our ideas of religion and cultures (Female 28, Male 26) 
The majority had never left London and had left only to make short visits within Europe. This 
reinforces that, in our sample at least, YMS Australians, are drawn to London and the ease of travel to 
Europe specifically, as opposed to the UK generally. YMS Australians chose to migrate to the UK 
specifically for three key reasons: 42 respondents said London offers better travel opportunities, 25 
respondents cited common language making the UK the ideal destination, and 20 respondents said the 
YMS visa itself is easy to acquire. It is possible that London is particularly attractive for YMS 
Australians specifically, yet the overall Australian population in the UK is disproportionately resident 
in London in contrast to the rest of the UK (53 per cent)xxxiv. 
 
Essentially London offers YMS Australians easy travel connections to Europe whilst at the same time 
being an English-speaking nation with similar cultural, political and social institutions to Australia. 
Moreover, the UK generally is a familiar place for YMS Australians with almost half our respondents 
having previously visited the UK. Crucially the UK offers YMS Australians familiar networks due to 
either extended family or other Australians being resident in the UK, with most of our sample (59) 
knowing another Australian living in London before arriving. London offers these young migrants − 
who are usually experiencing migration for the first time − both a level of familiarity and excitement.  
Conclusion  
Post Brexit immigration policy is currently unclear and may ultimately be determined by any trade 
deals the UK agree with reciprocal countries. Nonetheless, the loss of EU labour is likely to impact on 
particular sectors, especially low (or fundamental) skilled-based sectors. One of the government’s 
concrete proposals is to establish an EU wide YMS on the belief that YMS migrants undertake low 
skilled jobs. With no certification requirements on the current YMS visa, there is relatively little 
known about YMS migrants. Drawing on policy analysis alongside survey and interview data from 
Australian YMS migrants, this paper has sought to bridge some of the knowledge gaps as to the 
labour market activity and the motivations to migrate of YMS migrants.  
Our findings suggest that the assumptions surrounding the sectoral and skill distribution of YMS 
migrants as dominated in low-skilled sectors is potentially inaccurate. Whilst our sample was small 
and non-representative, the majority of Australian YMS migrants were working in high skilled 
professions. This calls into question whether the proposal for an EU wide YMS would necessarily 
alleviate post-Brexit residual labour shortages in low and mid skilled sectors. Whilst it is of course 
possible that other YMS migrants take up low skilled jobs in other UK regions, the abundance of 
middle or high skilled jobs in London, albeit precarious, provide little incentive for YMS migrants to 
undertake low skilled jobs.  
However, Australians are in many ways a unique and privileged migrant group in the UK’s 
immigration hierarchy; they are not necessarily reflective of wider YMS migrants profile or 
experience, nor can their relative satisfaction with the YMS be assumed for other migrant groups. 
Considering many EU nationals, including underemployed highly skilled individuals, work in low or 
mid skilled professions in the UK due to wage differentials from their sending country (especially 
from Central and Eastern Europe), it is possible that the proposed two-year visa may be attractive to 
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some, and therefore substitute for some residual low skilled shortages. This is especially because 
YMS visas allow for a longer residence than the proposed 12-month low skilled visa, with otherwise 
little difference in labour market restrictions. The proposed YMS may establish reciprocal agreements 
with non-EU countries, described as ‘other key players’, and this will make a substantial difference to 
the take-up of the scheme as it may offer a route for citizens of other countries who previously faced 
restrictions working in the UK. Key to the attractiveness of the YMS (especially in contrast to the 12-
month low skilled visa) will be whether, like the Australian government, the UK government choose 
to include a provision to channel YMS workers into specific areas of low skilled labour shortages. 
Given that the government will need to establish reciprocal agreements with individual countries, 
exactly which countries will be included and how quotas will be determined will be key to whether 
the scheme is attractive, whether YMS migrants concentrate in low skilled sectors and thus whether 
an  EU-YMS would fulfil the government’s ambition of plugging low skilled labour shortages. 
Nonetheless, key to the success and attractiveness of the current YMS visa is that it provides non-EU 
migrants an opportunity to travel Europe more widely. This is evidently the critical reason why 
Australian YMS migrants select the UK as their destination of choice. Given that EU citizens can 
freely travel, work and reside in all Member States, there is little reason to believe that the UK would 
be attractive for young EU citizens in this respect. A further reason YMS Australian migrants choose 
the UK is that English is the dominant language allowing migrants to acquire employment and 
integrate relatively easily. Evidently, this would not be the case for nationalities of the remaining 27 
Member States, thus reinforcing that an EU wide YMS would not necessarily be attractive to EU 
citizens. Of course EU migrants may wish to improve their English language skills by residing in the 
UK, but whether this alone is significant enough to attract young EU migrants is highly questionable.  
London as a global super diverse city with its cosmopolitanism and global reputation in many sectors 
provides a final motivation for YMS Australians to reside in the UK. Yet it is possible that Brexit, and 
the likely negative economic impact, may detrimentally effect London’s reputation in this regardxxxv, 
which raises questions around whether London would remain an attractive destination for young EU 
migrants.  Moreover, labour shortages from free movement ending are likely to hit many parts of the 
UK outside of London. All things considered, it is unlikely that the YMS visa would be as attractive 
to young EU migrants as it is with non-EU migrants. There is simply little to offer which EU migrants 
cannot acquire elsewhere in Europe with no limitations on their residency and opportunities to settle.  
More generally, expanding temporary migration routes runs the risk of increasing exploitation and 
potentially irregular migration. From the employer perspective, especially those in low skilled sectors, 
the training necessary for many jobs dissuades employers from hiring temporary migrants, in the 
knowledge that their workers will need to leave (Rolfe and Davies, 2017). At the same time, if the 
government were to propose certification requirements for YMS migrants in order to nudge and 
control migrant workers into specific sectors where shortages were rife, this creates the potential for 
exploitation (as seen in the WHM in Australia see Reilly 2015), and again offers employers little 
incentive to undergo a heavily bureaucratic and often expensive sponsorship process for workers who 
will leave within a short period.  
The policy evolution of the YMS visa reveals how the numerous administrations have remodelled the 
visa from a Commonwealth tourism scheme to a labour market route. If the government were to 
establish this as an EU wide scheme it would need to expand rights in order to make this attractive to 
EU migrants. This could include reinstating previous rights, such as allowing YMS migrants to transit 
to another visa whilst remaining in the UK (such as a Tier 2 visa), and providing a route to 
permanency by allowing the YMS visa time to count towards eligibility for indefinite leave to remain. 
This is especially pertinent given that our findings suggest that YMS migrants are skilled individuals 
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and thus more liberal rights attached to this visa could potentially be in line with the government’s 
aims to boost human capital and attract high skilled migrantsxxxvi. Evidently, even providing for a 
more attractive visa may not be enough to attract EU migrants to a country that is seen to have a 
reputation for being hostile to immigrants.   
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